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39 
Change and Continuity on the Supreme Court† 
Linda Greenhouse∗ 
When two new Justices joined the Supreme Court during the 2005 
term, the longest period of membership stability in the Court’s 
modern history came to an end. The eleven years without personnel 
change, from 1994 until 2005, made this the longest “natural court,” 
as scholars call the period during which the same Justices serve 
together, since the 1820s. And not since the 1971 Term, a generation 
ago, when Justices Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist took their 
seats, have two new Justices joined the Court during a single term. 
With personnel change, of course, comes institutional change. 
Justice Byron White, who served on the Court for thirty-one years 
and witnessed the arrival of thirteen new colleagues, once said that 
“every time a new justice comes to the Supreme Court, it’s a different 
court.”1 My interest today is actually better expressed not so much by 
that comment of Justice White’s, but by a question posed years 
earlier by Justice Robert Jackson. “Why is it,” Jackson asked in the 
preface to his book The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy, published 
shortly before he joined the court in 1941, “that the Court influences 
appointees more consistently than appointees influence the Court?”2 
Indeed, what makes the Court so fascinating as an exercise in 
small group dynamics is the relationship between personal and 
institutional change. Justices have an impact on the institution, 
obviously. That is why a Supreme Court nomination is such a major 
event, and why it is so often followed by a contentious confirmation 
 
 † This speech was delivered at Washington University in St. Louis School of Law as 
part of the 2006–2007 Public Interest Law Speakers Series.  
 ∗ Supreme Court correspondent. The New York Times. B.A. Radcliffe College 
(Harvard) 1968; Master of Studies in Law Yale Law School, 1978.  
 1. DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER WHITE 467 (1998). 
 2. ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: A STUDY OF A 
CRISIS IN AMERICAN POWER POLITICS vii (Octagon Books/Farrar, Straus & Giroux 1979) 
(1941). 
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process. But the impact of the institution on the individual justice is a 
bit more elusive, less obvious but no less important.  
My own work in the papers of Justice Harry Blackmun, which led 
to my book, Becoming Justice Blackmun: Harry Blackmun’s 
Supreme Court Journey, published in 2005,3 brought this subject 
home to me and whetted my appetite for a broader ranging 
examination of personal change on the Supreme Court. It is a very 
rich subject, and obviously a timely one. I plan to explore it with you, 
first by looking in some detail at the case, and career, of Harry 
Blackmun, and then by offering some general observations that might 
be worth keeping in mind as we watch the unfolding of the new 
Roberts Court, a Court that is still very much a work in progress as 
we await the decisions that will define at least this early period. 
Robert Jackson had no reason to suppose, when he raised his 
provocative question, how close to home it would come, in that he 
himself would personify the kind of personal and intellectual change 
that can occur on the Supreme Court. So before turning to more 
current events, let me speak for a few moments about one of the 
Twentieth Century’s most interesting Supreme Court justices.  
Robert Jackson took his seat on the Supreme Court on July 11, 
1941, and served until his death on October 9, 1954 at the age of 
sixty-two.4 Thirteen years is not a long tenure on the Supreme Court, 
and Jackson’s thirteen years included a year of service as the chief 
prosecutor at the Nuremberg war crimes trials.5 It was an amazingly 
consequential period in the life of the country with Pearl Harbor at 
the beginning, World War II and the start of the Cold War, including 
the Korean War, in the middle, and Brown v. Board of Education6 at 
the end. The country changed, the Court changed, and there is no 
doubt that Robert Jackson changed as well. 
Two opinions, one from the beginning of his tenure and one from 
near the end, demonstrate how much Jackson changed. The later 
opinion, his concurrence in the steel seizure case of 1952, 
 
 3. LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUN’S 
SUPREME COURT JOURNEY (2005). 
 4.  EUGENE C. GERHART, ROBERT H. JACKSON: COUNTRY LAWYER, SUPREME COURT 
JUSTICE, AMERICA’S ADVOCATE 233 (2003). 
 5.  See GERHART, supra note 4, at 253, 467. 
 6. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,7 is very famous. The earlier 
one is almost unknown except to scholars, because it was never 
issued. It was a separate opinion he wrote and then decided not to 
publish in the summer of 1942, when the Court was considering Ex 
parte Quirin,8 concerning the constitutionality of the wartime military 
commission that tried and sentenced to death eight Nazi saboteurs 
who were captured after entering the United States in June of that 
year.  
As a case about the dimensions of the wartime powers of the 
president, the Quirin case remains relevant. The Court unanimously 
upheld President Roosevelt’s use of the military commission that 
tried the saboteurs, finding, in contrast to the Court’s conclusion in 
June 2006 in the Hamdan case,9 that the commission had been 
lawfully constituted by Congress. The Court in Quirin thus did not 
have to reach or resolve the deeper question of whether, in the 
absence of congressional authorization, the president would have 
possessed the inherent authority to proceed as he wished.  
Jackson believed that the Court should have reached this question 
and should have decided it in the affirmative.10 The saboteurs, he 
wrote in his unpublished opinion, “are prisoners of the President by 
virtue of his status as the constitutional head of the military 
establishment.”11 And, he added, “[t]he custody and treatment of such 
prisoners of war is an exclusively military responsibility.”12 In other 
words, it was the President’s business, not the business of Congress 
or the federal courts. Jackson’s suggestion was that the Supreme 
Court should not even have undertaken to review Roosevelt’s 
exercise of his commander-in-chief authority. 
 
 7. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
 8. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
 9. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2759–60 (2006). 
 10. See Jack Goldsmith, Justice Jackson’s Unpublished Opinion in Ex parte Quirin, 9 
GREEN BAG 223 (2006) (the author reproduces and analyzes Justice Jackson’s draft opinion in 
Ex parte Quirin); see also Dennis J. Hutchinson, “The Achilles Heel” of the Constitution: 
Justice Jackson and the Japanese Exclusion Cases, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 455, 458–59 nn.21–24 
(2002). 
 11.  GOLDSMITH, supra note 10, at 237. 
 12. Id.  
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Yet just ten years later—a blink of an eye in Supreme Court 
terms, or maybe that is just my perspective, having covered the court 
for twenty-nine years—Robert Jackson expressed a very different 
view of presidential authority. During the Korean War, acting in what 
he deemed to be the national interest, President Truman seized the 
steel mills to prevent the nation’s manufacturing capacity, especially 
its wartime armaments-manufacturing capacity, from being crippled 
by a steel industry strike. Truman invoked his inherent authority as 
chief executive and commander-in-chief. The Supreme Court ruled 
that, lacking congressional authorization, the action was invalid.13 
Justice Jackson wrote a concurring opinion that has come to be seen 
as the most eloquent expression of limitations on presidential 
authority, an opinion that has lost none of its relevance and that was 
cited by the Supreme Court as recently as the final day of its 2005 
term.14 When the President acts pursuant to an express authorization 
from Congress, Jackson said, his power is at its peak, “for it includes 
all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can 
delegate.”15 When the President acts without congressional 
authorization, Jackson said, he enters a “zone of twilight” and 
uncertainty.16 And “when the President takes measures incompatible 
with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its 
lowest ebb.”17 
Was this the same Robert Jackson, the president’s man in the 
Quirin case? Clearly, his trajectory calls for some sort of explanation. 
One explanation is that in the Quirin case, arising as it did during the 
first year of his tenure on the Court, Jackson was still very much 
President Roosevelt’s man. Arriving in Washington from Western 
New York, early in the Roosevelt administration, to be chief counsel 
of the Internal Revenue Service, he had spent his entire Washington 
career in the administration’s service, quickly becoming head of the 
Justice Department’s Tax Division; then head of its Antitrust 
Division; then Solicitor General; and then Attorney General.18 It was 
 
 13.  See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 579. 
 14. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2799 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part). 
 15.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 635. 
 16.  Id. at 637. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  See GERHART, supra note 4, at 62–229. 
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certainly natural for him to view the exercise of government authority 
from the perspective of the executive branch. 
However, by 1952, he was a seasoned Supreme Court Justice who 
had seen at first hand, during his year at Nuremberg, the dire 
consequences of concentrated and unchallenged executive power. 
Not to equate Harry Truman with Adolf Hitler, as obviously Jackson 
did not, but Jackson certainly had a different perspective by the time 
he encountered the steel seizure case. As he had so presciently 
observed eleven years earlier, the institution and the life experience 
he had gained while serving there had changed him. 
The topic of personal change on the Supreme Court, although of 
obvious interest, largely has been ignored in scholarly literature. The 
study of judicial behavior long has been in the grip of political 
science theories that go under the names of “partisan entrenchment” 
or “the attitudinal model.”19 Political scientists had assumed, despite 
abundant evidence to the contrary, that judges go on the bench with 
fixed ideas that they strive to implement for the remainder of their 
careers. But scholars have recently begun to apply some welcome 
and overdue skepticism to these assumptions. “[M]any, if not most, 
Justices on the Supreme Court exhibited some degree of preference 
shifting during their careers,” Professor Theodore W. Ruger of the 
University of Pennsylvania Law School, wrote in a recent law review 
article.20 He proposed that instead of the “entrenchment” image, 
which suggests hard rocks and geology, we should use a nautical 
metaphor, in which judicial preferences are “anchored not in stable 
bedrock but rather a softer bottom that permits a meaningful, if slow, 
movement as currents change with time.”21 
Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal, and their co-authors have 
concluded in a recent empirical study of “ideological drift” among 
Supreme Court justices that change is the rule, not the exception, and 
that “contrary to the received wisdom, virtually every Justices serving 
since the 1930s has moved to the left or right or, in some cases, has 
 
 19. See, e.g., HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT POLICY MAKING: EXPLANATION AND 
PREDICTION (Richard J. Lamb et al. eds., 1979). 
 20.  Theodore W. Ruger, Justice Harry Blackmun and the Phenomenon of Judicial 
Preference Change, 70 M. L. REV. 1209, 1217 (2005). 
 21. Id. at 1225. 
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switched directions several times” during their tenure on the Court.22 
The database compiled by Epstein and her co-authors provides 
support for a phenomenon that has been obvious to the most casual 
court-watcher, one that led President Bush to declare, defensively, 
when he nominated his White House counsel, Harriet Miers, to the 
Court that “I know her well enough to be able to say she’s not going 
to change.”23 With a barely disguised reference to conservatives’ 
disappointment in his father’s nomination of Justice David H. Souter, 
the President said: “I don’t want to put somebody on the bench who 
is this way today, and changes.”24 
To see how Supreme Court justices change, we do not have to go 
back as far as Robert Jackson, or even as far as Harry Blackmun, who 
retired from the court in 1994.25 We can look at Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor, whose tenure on the Court at twenty-four years was 
almost exactly as long as Blackmun’s, and who retired in January 
2006. Justice O’Connor ended her tenure on the Supreme Court as a 
very different Justice from the one who arrived from Arizona in 
1981, or the one who spoke disparagingly of Roe v. Wade in 1983,26 
or even the one who in 1992 published a tribute to the newly retired 
Thurgood Marshall in which she described Marshall as an 
embodiment of “moral truth.”27 The experience of knowing and 
working with Thurgood Marshall, O’Connor said then, of sitting with 
him at conference for ten years, listening to him tell stories from his 
 
 22. Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and 
How Important?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 127 (2007). 
 23.  Press Release, President George Bush, Press Conference at the Rose Garden (Oct. 4, 
2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/print/20051004-1.html. 
 24. Id. 
 25. But see David A. Strauss, It’s Time to Deal With Reality: The Myth of the 
Unpredictable Supreme Court Justice Debunked, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 7, 2005, at C9 (“The idea 
that judges change their basic philosophical views once they are on the bench is a myth”). 
 26. Compare Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 458 (1983) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (criticizing the “Roe framework” as “clearly on a collision course 
with itself” in the first abortion-related case she encountered after joining the Court), with 
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (participating in the joint opinion, 
O’Connor reaffirmed the “Roe framework”). 
 27.  Sandra Day O’Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The Influences of a Raconteur, 44 STAN. 
L. REV. 1217 (1992). 
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amazing life, “would, by and by, perhaps change the way I see the 
world.”28 
It seemed an odd sentiment from a Justice whose jurisprudence at 
that time appeared to bear little of Thurgood Marshall’s imprint, 
certainly not in the core areas of voting rights and racially conscious 
affirmative action.29 Yet “by and by,” as we all know, came to pass. 
In 2003, Sandra O’Connor led the Court in reasserting a role for 
affirmative action in university admissions in Grutter v. Bollinger,30 
the University of Michigan Law School case. Now, with Justice 
O’Connor gone, it may be no coincidence that the Court quickly 
agreed to revisit the question of race and education, in the two cases 
it decided in June 2007 on the constitutionality of race-conscious 
student assignment policies adopted by public school systems 
struggling to maintain hard-won integration.31 I do not have much 
doubt that early in her career, Justice O’Connor would have found 
these policies highly problematic if not constitutionally unacceptable. 
Later, however, she would probably have agreed with Judge Alex 
Kozinski’s view, expressed in an opinion concurring with the en banc 
Ninth Circuit in the Seattle case, that this was the kind of pragmatic 
policy decision, taken by democratically accountable officials, with 
which federal judges should be very reluctant to interfere.32 If my 
assumption is correct, the cases would have been decided 5 to 4 the 
other way: the challenged plans in Louisville and Seattle would have 
been upheld rather than invalidated under the 14th Amendment. 
I will return in a moment to Harry Blackmun, but first, it must 
also be acknowledged that change during a justice’s career on the 
Supreme Court is not universal. Let me offer you a dissenting opinion 
from the 2004 Term that bears the name of Justice Clarence Thomas. 
 
 28. Id. at 1220. 
 29.  See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Miller v. Johnson, 
515 U.S. 900 (1995). 
 30. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 31. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 
2005), cert. granted, 74 U.S.L.W. 3676 (U.S. Jun. 5, 2006) (No. 05-908); Meredith v. Jefferson 
County Bd. of Educ., 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 74 U.S.L.W. 3676 (U.S. Jun. 
5, 2006) (No. 05-915). 
 32. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. II, 426 F.3d 1162, 1193 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc), 
(Kozinski, J., concurring). 
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The question in Deck v. Missouri33 was the constitutionality of 
shackling a defendant in the presence of the jury during the capital 
sentencing phase of a criminal trial. The defendant had been 
convicted of shooting an elderly couple to death in the course of 
robbing them.34  
The routine use of visible shackles during the guilt phase of a 
criminal trial has long been forbidden under a rule that has deep roots 
in English common law, based on the presumption that the sight of a 
defendant tied up like a mad dog would naturally prejudice the jury. 
But surprisingly, the use of shackles during the punishment phase of 
a capital case was an open question in American law. By a majority 
of seven to two, Thomas and Scalia dissenting, the Court ruled in 
Deck v. Missouri that for constitutional purposes, the two situations 
were the same, and that the use of shackles during the sentencing 
phase without special justification violates the defendant’s right to 
due process.35 
We know that Justice Thomas is a traditionalist and self-described 
“originalist,” but he argued in his dissenting opinion that tradition 
should not apply.36 Modern day shackles were different from the 
pain-inducing shackles of olden times, he said.37 “The belly chain and 
handcuffs are of modest, if not insignificant weight,” he wrote.38 
“Neither they nor the leg irons cause pain or suffering, let alone pain 
or suffering that would interfere with a defendant’s ability to assist in 
his defense at trial.”39 Given that a defendant during a sentencing 
hearing stands before the jury as one who has already been found 
guilty, he said, “the court’s holding defies common sense.”40 
I found this opinion quite startling, yet it received very little 
attention in the press, on the blogs, or among academic 
commentators. Perhaps that is because we are all inured to Justice 
 
 33. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005). 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. at 635. 
 36.  Id. at 635–51. 
 37.  Id. at 640. 
 38.  Id.  
 39.  Deck, 544 U.S. at 640. 
 40. Id. at 636. 
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Thomas. After all, it was in Hudson v. McMillian,41 during his first 
term on the Court, that he dissented from a decision holding that the 
use of excessive force against a prison inmate can violate the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment even if 
no serious injury results. The Framers, Thomas said, “simply did not 
conceive of the Eighth Amendment as protecting inmates from harsh 
treatment.”42 The forty-five year-old Clarence Thomas let us know 
then, in the opening months of his tenure, what kind of Justice he 
would be. 
This brings us back to Harry Blackmun, and the Justice he 
became. Harry Blackmun was sixty-one years old when Richard 
Nixon, in an increasingly desperate search for a confirmable law-and-
order nominee, named him to the Supreme Court in 1970. Before the 
choice was final, Attorney General John Mitchell had asked a young 
Justice Department lawyer to vet Blackmun’s record on the Eighth 
Circuit. Assistant Attorney General William H. Rehnquist, 
discharging that assignment, pronounced Blackmun acceptable—that 
is, professionally respectable and reliably conservative.43 
Indeed, the early Justice Harry Blackmun offered few surprises. 
The first major constitutional confrontation during his tenure on the 
Supreme Court was over the death penalty, and when the Court 
invalidated every death penalty statute in the country in Furman v. 
Georgia in 1972,44 Blackmun dissented. When the Court ruled 
against the Nixon Administration’s effort to stop publication of the 
Pentagon Papers,45 Blackmun dissented. 
In 1973, he wrote the opinion for the Court in United States v. 
Kras,46 a bankruptcy case that challenged the constitutionality of 
requiring a fifty dollar fee as a condition of filing for bankruptcy. 
Could the statute be applied to one who was too poor to pay? 
Blackmun was skeptical of respondent Robert Kras’s claim that he 
 
 41.  Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 42. Id. at 19. 
 43. GREENHOUSE, supra note 3, at 46–47. Harry A. Blackmun, Harry A. Blackmun Papers 
(1970) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division Box 
1360) [hereinafter HAB Papers]. 
 44. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 405 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 45. N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 759 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 46. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973). 
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could not afford the fifty dollars. Blackmun noted in the memo he 
wrote to himself before the argument in the fall of 1972, that Kras 
had turned down the chance to pay the fee in installments, $1.28 a 
week for nine months.47 In his opinion for the Court rejecting the 
constitutional challenge to the filing fee, he wrote dismissively that 
Kras could have paid the fee for a weekly installment of “less than 
the price of a movie and little more than the cost of a pack or two of 
cigarettes.”48  
The dissents were stinging. “[T]he desperately poor almost never 
go to see a movie, which the majority seems to believe is an almost 
weekly activity,” Thurgood Marshall wrote.49 William O. Douglas, 
another of the four dissenters, wrote about the case some months later 
in his memoir, Go East, Young Man, observing that “Never did I 
dream that I would live to see the day when a court held that a person 
could be too poor to get the benefits of bankruptcy.”50  
Blackmun was undeterred. He was gratified more than a year later 
to hear from the government lawyer who had argued the case that 
Kras had paid the fifty dollars in full barely a month after the 
decision. “I always had a feeling that there was something wrong 
with this case,” Blackmun responded to the lawyer.51 In an “I-told-
you-so” gesture, he then circulated the lawyer’s letter to the 
dissenters. 
Yet barely four years later, we see a very different Harry 
Blackmun, one who confronted the rights of the poor in another 
context that evoked from him a much different response. A trio of 
cases reached the Court during the 1976 term on the question of the 
government’s obligation to pay for abortions for women who could 
not afford them. The Roe v. Wade majority of three years earlier, 
Potter Stewart, Lewis Powell, and Warren Burger, fractured over this 
question and left Blackmun alone in dissent. John Paul Stevens, the 
newest member of the Court, who had succeeded Douglas, also 
abandoned Blackmun. Blackmun was left to speak for the poor in his 
 
 47. See GREENHOUSE, supra note 3, at 108; HAB Papers, supra note 43, at Box 156. 
 48. Kras, 409 U.S. at 449. 
 49. Id. at 460 (Marshall, J. dissenting). 
 50. WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, GO EAST, YOUNG MAN: THE EARLY YEARS 175 (1974). 
 51. See GREENHOUSE, supra note 3, at 109–10; HAB Papers, supra note 43, at Box 156. 
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dissenting opinion in Beal v. Doe,52 one of the most powerful dissents 
of his career. “There is another world ‘out there,’ the existence of 
which the Court, I suspect, either chooses to ignore or fears to 
recognize” he wrote.53 Was this the same Justice whose tone had 
been so dismissive, even smug, in the bankruptcy case just four years 
earlier? What was happening to Harry Blackmun? 
It is the thesis of my book that what transformed him was the 
fortuity of having been assigned by his childhood friend, Chief 
Justice Burger, to write for the Court in Roe v. Wade.54 Blackmun 
was shocked by the public response to Roe—not only by the criticism 
of the opinion and its outcome, but by the way in which he personally 
was vilified and lionized. He was the one who got the hate mail, 
letters by the tens of thousands (he saved them all and gave them to 
the Library of Congress, which decided to preserve only a random 
sample), the death threats, and the pickets wherever he went for the 
rest of his career.55 Yet on the other side, he was the one who became 
a hero to women’s groups in whose cause he was at most a reluctant 
foot soldier, if that: Roe, after all, was about the rights of doctors, and 
only incidentally about the rights of women.  
Initially, Blackmun resisted the efforts by both sides to attach Roe 
to him personally. It’s not my opinion, he would say. It was the 
opinion of the Court. The vote was seven to two. He received the 
assignment and he fulfilled it. But the personification was so 
relentless that eventually, perhaps inevitably, Blackmun did 
incorporate Roe v. Wade into his self-image in a profound way. He 
was not only the father of abortion rights in America, in his own 
mind, but he devoted himself to becoming the defender of those 
rights as the climate changed both outside the Court and within it. I 
say “perhaps inevitably” because someone with a different 
personality structure might have reacted differently. It is hard to 
imagine a William Brennan collecting his hate mail and brooding 
over it. But throughout his life, Blackmun displayed a tendency to 
 
 52. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 53.  Id. at 463 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 54.  See GREENHOUSE, supra note 3, at 82. 
 55.  Id. at 134–35. 
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personify events around him.56 He dwelled, he brooded, he was in 
pain—and in the process, he became attuned to the pain of others: to 
“poor Joshua” of the DeShaney case,57 tragic victim of an abusive 
father and an inadequate government safety net; to those who found 
their way to death row through incompetent legal counsel and judicial 
shortcuts; to women who were victims of sex discrimination, a 
concept for which the Court had no constitutional language at the 
time it confronted the abortion cases, and to which Harry Blackmun 
eventually came around in a quite grudging and ultimately rather 
improbable alliance with his future colleague, Ruth Bader Ginsburg. 
How might the Harry Blackmun of 1970 have evolved had 
Warren Burger chosen someone else for the assignment in Roe v. 
Wade,58 if Roe never became for Blackmun more than just another 
case? Or if Roe had not become so embattled both inside the Court 
and out, leading Blackmun to assign himself the mission of defending 
it against all enemies? Of course we will never know the answer to 
any of those questions,59 but there are major areas of his 
jurisprudence that can plausibly be seen as grounded in Roe, or at 
least in how he experienced Roe. Commercial speech is one example. 
Without Roe, would the commercial speech claim in Bigelow v. 
Virginia60 have caught his interest? The speech at issue in that case 
was an advertisement for an abortion referral service.61 In writing for 
the Court that the advertisement was deserving of First Amendment 
protection, Blackmun launched a reappraisal of commercial speech 
that went on to bring us, for better or worse, advertising by lawyers, 
doctors, and other professionals, and the robust and sometimes 
controversial corporate speech that fills the airwaves today.62 It was 
one of his most important doctrinal contributions. 
 
 56. See GREENHOUSE, supra note 3, at 134–35. 
 57. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
 58.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 59. The concept of “path dependence,” from economics comes to mind; see Linda 
Greenhouse, Harry Blackmun, Independence and Path Dependence, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 1235 
(2005). 
 60. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  See GREENHOUSE, supra note 3, at 116–21. 
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I think it is unlikely, based on his earlier opinions, that he would 
have so passionately taken up the cause of poor women except for the 
context in which the question arose: abortion funding. Nevertheless, 
these later cases helped move him away from his initial doctor-
centered view of the abortion right and toward his eventual embrace 
of a unified jurisprudence of women’s rights and abortion rights. 
How he eventually got there is a long story, but I will give you just 
one example from his papers of how far he had to come. Early in the 
Court’s 1973 term, a pair of cases arrived at the Court challenging the 
then common practice by public school systems of requiring teachers 
to take unpaid maternity leaves midway through their pregnancy, 
before their vulnerable young students could notice anything. 
Presumably, it was less traumatic for the students if their invisibly 
pregnant teachers suddenly disappeared rather than grow visibly 
larger and give birth.63 Most of the Justices thought these policies 
were unfair, but three years before Craig v. Boren64 made sex 
discrimination subject to heightened judicial scrutiny, these Justices 
lacked the constitutional vocabulary to express what, exactly, the 
problem was. In a memo that Blackmun wrote to himself while 
preparing for argument, we can see him struggling to get a handle on 
the issue: 
It is easy to say initially that any regulation which relates to 
pregnancy is automatically and per se sex discriminatory. I am 
not at all certain that this is necessarily so. Actually, what the 
regulation does is to draw distinctions between classes of 
women, that is, those who are pregnant and those who are not 
pregnant, rather than between male and female. It is somewhat 
similar to an Army regulation requiring that enlisted men be 
shaved and not wear beards or mustaches. Such a regulation 
discriminates between one class of men and another class of 
men, and not as between men and women.65 
 
 63. See GREENHOUSE, supra note 3, at 213–15. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur and 
Cohen v. Chesterfield County Sch. Bd. were consolidated for decision at 414. U.S. 632 (1974). 
 64. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
 65.  HAB Papers, supra note 43, at Box 203. 
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At the top of this typewritten memo, Blackmun added a 
handwritten note: “Not sex related.”66 He eventually joined a 
majority opinion that invalidated the mandatory leave policies on the 
basis of due process. The word “discrimination” did not appear in 
Potter Stewart’s majority opinion in Cleveland Board of Education v. 
LaFleur.67 So, Blackmun did have far to go, but so did the Court. 
Blackmun did not instinctively grasp what the young Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg was trying to convey to the Court during her carefully 
constructed strategic litigation campaign of the 1970s, but neither did 
he close his eyes and turn away from it, even when his law clerks 
advised him to do so.68 During this period, the Court was gradually 
constructing a language and jurisprudence of women’s rights. 
Blackmun was not a leader. However, it is fairly clear that the more 
entrenched he became in his defense of Roe, the more receptive he 
became to the claims of women’s equality. By 1986, in his opinion in 
the Thornburgh69 case, we see a description of what it means to a 
woman to have the right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy, 
a description very different in tone from the doctor-centered language 
of Roe: “Few decisions are more personal and intimate, more 
properly private, or more basic to individual dignity and autonomy 
. . .”70 
Toward the end of his career, Blackmun would occasionally deny 
that he had changed very much, but the statistics tell the story. In 
closely divided cases, he voted with Burger 87.5% of the time during 
his first five terms and with Brennan only 13%.71 During the next five 
years, 1975–1980, he voted with Brennan 54.5% of the time and 
 
 66. Id. 
 67.  Roe, 414 U.S. at 633. 
 68. See, e.g., Memorandum from law clerk to Justice Blackmun, on Weinberger v. 
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (Dec. 23, 1974) (unpublished manuscripts, on file with 
Library of Congress); see also GREENHOUSE, supra note 3, at 216–17 (discussing the law 
clerk’s memorandum). 
 69.  Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986). 
 70. Id. at 772. 
 71.  GREENHOUSE, supra note 3, at 186 (citing Joseph Kobylka, Speech at the Midwest 
Political Science Association: Discovering Judicial Compassion: The Evolving Egalitarianism 
of Harry A. Blackmun (Apr. 2001) (on file with author) (compiling data based on annual 
statistical summary); see also Ruger, supra note 20, at nn.21, 27, 35, 36 (collecting statistical 
studies of voting patterns). 
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Burger 45.5%.72 During the final five years that Blackmun and 
Burger served together, 1981–1986, Blackmun joined Brennan in 
70.6% of the divided cases and Burger in only 32.4%.73 
So this is the question: Which types of Justices are open to 
change, and which are not? Can we draw conclusions from our recent 
and not so recent experience as we wait for the Roberts Court to 
reveal itself more fully?  
Predictions are as dangerous as they are irresistible. As a starting 
point, we might do well to consider a new Justice’s stance toward the 
body of law of which he or she is now a guardian. Although 
Blackmun developed a sense of mission and was propelled by it in 
the way I have just described, it is important to note that he did not 
arrive at the Court with any agenda (beyond survival, which early in 
his tenure, he doubted). Neither did Justice O’Connor; instead she 
concentrated on climbing the steep learning curve required to make 
the transition from the Arizona Court of Appeals and her earlier 
career in elective politics.  
Both Blackmun and O’Connor experienced the personal 
disruption of a midlife move to a distant city and culture with which 
they were almost entirely unfamiliar. This mind-bending experience, 
and their lack of a personal agenda, left each of these Justices open to 
new and unexpected influences in a way that Clarence Thomas, for 
example, has not been. The world of Clarence Thomas, a product of 
bureaucratic Washington by the time he was named to the Court at 
the age of forty-three, has become more insular and self-reinforcing, 
while the worlds of Harry Blackmun and Sandra O’Connor became 
ever more open.  
For seventeen summers, Blackmun left Washington for the Aspen 
Institute, where he would conduct a seminar in which people from 
around the country and the world would wrestle with age-old debates 
about justice and society.74 Justice O’Connor traveled widely, 
interacting with judges of other constitutional courts and spending 
 
 72.  Id. 
 73. Id. (citing data compiled by Joseph F. Kobylka, based on the annual statistical 
summary in the Harvard Law Review; Ruger, op. cit., at nn.21, 27, 35, and 36 (collecting other 
statistical studies of voting patterns). 
 74. See Dennis J. Hutchinson, Aspen and the Transformation of Harry Blackmun, 2005 
SUP. CT. REV. 307, 310–11 (2005). 
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many hours working with the American Bar Association’s project on 
the rule of law in central and eastern Europe.75 She became a 
champion of the idea that American courts benefit from studying and 
acknowledging legal developments in the rest of the world.76 
I should note that I am not the first or only observer of the Court 
to see a correlation between a mid-life move to Washington and a 
new Justice’s amenability to change. “Newcomers to Washington are 
risks,” one conservative commentator, Terry Eastland, observed in 
1993, with reference to Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, and Sandra 
Day O’Connor.77 Lawrence Baum, a political scientist who 
specializes in judicial behavior, notes in an interesting new book that 
a statistical analysis of the voting patterns by Republican-appointed 
Supreme Court Justices since Earl Warren demonstrates that 
“residency had a greater impact on voting change than initial 
ideological positions.”78 Justices appointed from outside Washington 
were more likely to become more liberal on civil liberties issues, 
Baum observes, noting that on this scale, “the difference between the 
most conservative and least conservative Republican appointee in 
voting change was not nearly as great as the difference between 
Washington residents and newcomers.”79 
Professor Michael Dorf of Columbia Law School has come to the 
same conclusion through a slightly different lens. Looking at the 
twelve Justices appointed by Republican Presidents beginning with 
Richard Nixon’s appointment of Warren Burger, he observes that the 
six who had Executive Branch experience before joining the Supreme 
Court (Burger, Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, and—projecting—Roberts 
and Alito) changed very little,80 while the six who had never served 
in the Executive Branch of the federal government (Blackmun, 
 
 75.  See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Defeis, A Tribute to Justice Sandra Day O’Connor from an 
International Perspective, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 391 (1997). 
 76.  See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 77. Terry Eastland, The Tempting of Justice Kennedy, AM. SPECTATOR, Feb. 1993, 37 n.3, 
cited in LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL 
BEHAVIOR 144 (2006). 
 78.  BAUM, supra note 77, at 150–51. 
 79. Id. at 150–51. 
 80.  Michael Dorf, Does Federal Executive Branch Experience Explain Why Some 
Republican Supreme Court Justices ‘Evolve’ and Others Don’t?, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
457–76 (2007). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol25/iss1/5
p 39 Greenhouse book pages.doc  5/23/2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2007]  Change and Continuity 55 
 
 
Powell, Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter) became more 
liberal during their Supreme Court service.81 It is an interesting 
chicken-and-egg problem. Executive Branch service, at least among 
ambitious young conservatives, seems to serve as a proxy for 
Washington experience. These individuals engaged in self-selection 
and were then, of course, selected by Presidents who might have seen 
their Executive Branch service as a good indicator of ideological 
commitment and reliability. 
Our new Chief Justice, John Roberts, fits this pattern to a striking 
degree. He does not face a notably steep learning curve. Few people 
have come to the Court as familiar with the institution and the docket. 
Between his service as a government lawyer—in the Justice 
Department and the White House—and his distinguished career in 
private practice before the Court, there are few issues he has not 
confronted.82 He did not have to go through the challenging 
experience of a mid-life move to a distant city.83 In moving from one 
federal courthouse to another, his daily commute from his close 
Maryland suburb grew by only six blocks.  
For Roberts, the forces for change that confronted Blackmun and 
O’Connor may be absent. David Strauss of the University of 
Chicago, for one, wrote shortly after Roberts was nominated that 
“whatever his views are now, the Senate, and the American people, 
should count on his being the same person throughout the thirty or so 
years he is likely to spend on the Court if he is confirmed.”84 I think 
that is a little categorical, but it is not completely unfounded. 
Although Samuel Alito came to the Court after fifteen years as a 
federal appeals court judge with chambers in New Jersey, the 
formative period of his early legal career was spent in Washington, 
including arguing before the Supreme Court as a young lawyer in the 
Solicitor General’s office.85 The discourse of the Court, and the legal 
community that centers around it, is certainly familiar to him. 
Whether by the Baum residency measure, or Michael Dorf’s focus on 
 
 81. Id.  
 82. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, BIOGRAPHIES OF CURRENT JUSTICES 1 
(2006), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf.  
 83.  Id. 
 84. See Strauss, supra note 25. 
 85.  SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 82, at 3. 
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prior Executive Branch service, neither of the new Justices fit the 
pattern of those likely to display significant ideological drift. 
Of course, that tentative conclusion begs the question of the 
location of their starting points. While there is little doubt that they 
are on the conservative side of the Court’s current spectrum, are 
either of these new Justices on a mission, in service of a personal 
agenda to remake constitutional law? I strive to remain agnostic. On 
the one hand, I see insiders, comfortable with the status quo that has 
brought them success and professional fulfillment. I do not sense the 
anger and axe-grinding of a Thomas or Scalia. Or, to go back just a 
bit further, I do not see a Warren Burger, who had been at war with 
the liberals on the D.C. Circuit while he served there, and approached 
the Chief Justiceship girded for continued battle and seeing enemies 
all around him, as his correspondence at the time with his friend 
Harry Blackmun makes dramatically evident.86 Nor do I see a young 
William Rehnquist, who emerged from a Supreme Court clerkship 
and lived through the 1950s and 1960s deeply persuaded that 
constitutional law was on the wrong course and needed to be 
wrenched back.87 On the other hand, I see young Justices in a hurry to 
reshape the law to their liking across doctrinal areas from Equal 
Protection to standing.88 
Another new book, not about the Court at all, offers some insight 
as we consider the forces for personal change that operate on 
Supreme Court Justices. In Private Lives, Public Consequences: 
Personality and Politics in Modern America, historian William Chafe 
presents portraits of national leaders from Franklin D. Roosevelt to 
Bill Clinton and tries to identify the connection between the personal 
and the political.89 Most of these individuals endured some crisis that 
had the result of causing or forcing them to see things in a new way. 
Looking at the Supreme Court through the same lens, I think it is 
clear that for Blackmun, the crisis was the trauma of his early years at 
the Court, a period that included Roe v. Wade90 and its aftermath. I 
 
 86. GREENHOUSE, supra note 3, at 44; HAB Papers, supra note 43, Boxes 50 and 51. 
 87.  See generally CRAIG BRADLEY, THE REHNQUIST LEGACY 1–5 (2006). 
 88. See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007). 
 89. WILLIAM H. CHAFE, PRIVATE LIVES, PUBLIC CONSEQUENCES: PERSONALITY AND 
POLITICS IN MODERN AMERICA (2006). 
 90.  See generally Roe, 401 U.S. 113. 
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am not aware of a crisis in the lives of John Roberts or Sam Alito that 
would have shattered their received notions of how the world works.  
Let me conclude on a note of modesty about the dangers of 
predictions and generalizations. The Court’s very recent history 
should warn us against jumping to quick conclusions about what lies 
ahead, especially when we are considering the future tenure of 
relatively young men who are likely to still be on the Court when my 
twenty-one year-old daughter is approaching middle age. We thought 
we knew William Rehnquist pretty well by the time he approached 
his third decade on the Court. Who would have imagined that it 
would have been Rehnquist, at war with the Miranda doctrine for 
much of his judicial career, who on a June morning seven years ago 
would announce the court’s judgment in Dickerson v. United States,91 
and reaffirm the Miranda decision and describe it as “part of our 
national culture?”92  
I was equally surprised four years later to hear Chief Justice 
Rehnquist announce the Court’s judgment in Locke v. Davey,93 
rejecting the argument that a state that provided financial aid at the 
college level to needy and deserving students had to provide the same 
basis of support for students studying for the ministry. This 
underestimated decision put the brakes on the school voucher 
movement, of which Chief Justice Rehnquist was the doctrinal 
godfather in a series of Establishment Clause rulings going back to 
Mueller v. Allen,94 decided twenty years earlier, and continuing 
through the Ohio school voucher case, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,95 
in 2002. And recall Chief Justice Rehnquist’s surprising opinion for 
the Court in the 2003 Family and Medical Leave Act case, Nevada 
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,96 in which the Court 
rejected the state’s claim of Eleventh Amendment immunity from 
suit after having accepted such claims in a series of cases challenging 
 
 91. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
 92.  Id. at 443. 
 93. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004). 
 94. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983). 
 95. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 534 U.S. 1111 (2002). 
 96. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003). 
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congressional efforts to extend federal civil rights protections to state 
employees.97 
The William Rehnquist of the final years of his tenure, in other 
words, was not necessarily the Justice we thought we knew from the 
beginning, middle, or even late middle of his career.98 The question 
is, what happened? I do not think Rehnquist changed his views in any 
fundamental way; in fact, I don’t think he changed his views about 
anything that was really important to him during his adult lifetime. 
What I think he acquired, however, was a different perspective, one 
that included not only his personal agenda but the long-term 
institutional interests of the Supreme Court. He was a very smart man 
whose effectiveness derived in no small part from his ability to see 
around corners, and in the cases I have mentioned, that kind of vision 
told him that it was time to hold back—to mix metaphors, that it was 
not the time to follow the logical implications of the Court’s recent 
precedents right off a cliff. The last few years of the Rehnquist Court 
provide us with a case study of the impact of the institutional on the 
personal. It is worth noting, of course, that Chief Justice John Roberts 
clerked for Rehnquist, who still is his mentor, and Rehnquist himself 
clerked for Robert Jackson, so we are back where we started.99  
It is also worth observing of another Chief Justice, Earl Warren, 
that his first term was a very poor predictor of the kind of justice that 
he would become. Warren had spent twenty-three years of his life as 
a local prosecutor and state attorney general.100 During his first term 
on the Court, 1953, he voted against criminal defendants and civil 
rights litigants most of the time.101 But over the next fifteen years, as 
we know, he became their champion.102 
 
 97. See, e.g., Robert C. Post and Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the 
People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L. REV. 1 (2003). 
 98. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Foreword to CRAIG M. BRADLEY, THE REHNQUIST 
LEGACY, at xiii to xii (2006); Erwin Chemerinsky, Just Right? Assessing the Rehnquist Court’s 
Parting Words on Criminal Justice: The Rehnquist Court and the Death Penalty, 94 GEO. L.J. 
1367 (2006). 
 99.  SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 82, at 1. 
 100.  See JIM NEWTON, JUSTICE FOR ALL: EARL WARREN AND THE NATION HE MADE 45–
87 (2006). 
 101.  Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and 
How Important?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007). 
 102. Epstein, supra note 22, at Fig. 6. 
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That is, of course, another story.103 The point is that every 
Supreme Court Justice will have his or her own story—a story that, 
just maybe, will surprise us. 
 
 103. See JIM NEWTON, JUSTICE FOR ALL: EARL WARREN AND THE NATION HE MADE 
(2006). 
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